We present an empirical study of spatial competition and a methodology to estimate demand for products with unobservable characteristics. Using panel data, we estimate a discrete choice model with latent product attributes and unobserved heterogenous consumer preferences. Our application of the methodology to the network television industry yields estimates that are consistent with experts' views. Given our estimates, we compute Nash equilibria of a product location game, and find that firms' observed strategies (such as the degree of product differentiation) are generally optimal. Discrepancies between actual and optimal strategies reflect the networks' adherence to "rules of thumb," and possibly, bounded rationality behavior.
Introduction
Most empirical industry studies focus on price competition, conditional on a given set of product characteristics. Competition in product space is also important. For example, in information industries, such as media and entertainment, the strategic choices are primarily nonmonetary product characteristics. Analysis of competition in these industries is often complicated by the presence of unobservable or difficult to measure product characteristics. For example, the relevant attributes of television shows are not obvious.
We present an empirical study of spatial competition and a methodological approach to estimating product characteristics and consumer preferences for products whose characteristics are unobservable or difficult to measure. We use panel data on consumers' choices to identify (a) the attribute space over which firms compete, (b) product locations on these attributes, and (c) the distribution of consumer preferences. The econometric method is applied to analyze competition for viewers in the television industry. The estimated attribute space and product locations are consistent with experts' views of this industry. For example, one of the attributes represents the degree of realism in each show. The estimated product locations reveal that firms use counterprogramming (i.e., differentiated products in each time slot) and homogeneous programming (i.e., similar products through each night). These strategies are confirmed to be optimal in an equilibrium analysis given our estimated demand. We compute a Nash equilibrium that suggests firms can improve their weekly ratings by about 10 percent by increasing both counterprogramming and homogeneity.
The first part of the paper (Sections 2-4) presents the econometric methodology, while the latter part (Sections 5 and 6) applies it to the television industry and analyzes spatial competition.
In Section 2 we describe the discrete choice model of viewer behavior. Consumer utility is specified to have an ideal point structure, with utility decreasing in the distance between the consumer's most preferred level of the attributes and a product's attributes. 1 The identification of show characteristics and consumer preferences is not obvious. We do not observe the attribute space relevant to viewers' choices, nor the attribute levels for each show, nor the ideal point of each consumer. 2 We do observe panel data of each viewer's choice in each period, as described in Section 3. These choice histories, even with a single airing of each show, provide the covariance of choices that identifies the covariance matrix of utility for the products. For example, two products consumed by many of the same individuals will have a positive covariance of utility. As discussed in Section 4.4, we use the latent attribute space to parameterize the covariance matrix of utility such that products with positive covariance terms are located near each other. Note that no meaning is assigned a priori to the dimensions of the attribute space. As such, interpreting each estimated dimension is important to understanding viewer behavior and product differentiation. The model is estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. Furthermore, in order to reduce simulation error we use both importance sampling and low-discrepancy, deterministic sequences as described by Niederreiter (1978) and the literature on quasi monte carlo integration. The effectiveness of these simulation methods is described in Section 4.3.
In Section 5 the econometric approach is applied to the television industry. The television industry is an economically important industry whose products are difficult to characterize. In 2000 advertisers spent about 52 billion dollars on television ads. 3 Revenues depend on audience size and composition. 4 Despite these high stakes, techniques for using industry data to analyze this market are not well developed. Our study is facilitated by Nielsen Media Research's panel data set of individuals' viewing choices. We analyze the viewing choices of 3286 viewers in the week of November 9, 1992, Monday through Friday, during the prime time hours of 8 to 11 p.m. We identify four attributes, which we interpret as plot complexity, character ages, degree of realism, and appeal to young male urban professionals. These characteristics are in accord with the beliefs of network strategists and previous studies of viewer behavior.
In Section 6 we use our estimated attribute space to analyze product differentiation in the network television industry and various scheduling strategies. The estimates of show characteristics imply that the networks use counterprogramming and homogeneous programming, although not as extensively as they should. 5 These strategies are found to be consistent with competitive behavior in this industry. That is, in the Nash equilibrium in which firms maximize ratings, these strategies are widely implemented. In fact, they are implemented more extensively than in the actual schedules, resulting in gains in weekly ratings of 13.3 percent for ABC, 6.1 percent for CBS, and 15.7 percent for NBC. Two "rules of thumb"-not airing sitcoms after 10:00 and not airing news magazines before 10:00-are primarily responsible for the networks' suboptimal ratings. Even after controlling for these conventions, we still find discrepancies between actual and optimal schedules. However, these discrepancies are lower in a model restricted to have only two latent attributes. This suggests that network strategists may reduce the complexity of the strategy space by thinking of fewer dimensions than the true attribute space. Interestingly, the collusive outcome, which maximizes the networks' combined ratings, does not yield ratings higher than the Nash equilibrium ratings.
We now provide a brief review of the relevant choice modeling literature, followed by a discussion of empirical research on the network television industry.
Similar strategies of using panel data to estimate latent characteristics and individuals' preferences appear in the literature on voting. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) use a transformed logit model to estimate both the locations of legislators' ideal points and the locations of legislative bills in a unidimensional attribute space. Heckman and Snyder (1997) note that the Poole-Rosenthal estimator is inconsistent due to the "incidental parameters" problem first identified by Neyman and Scott (1948) . We avoid this problem by estimating the distribution of preferences, as suggested by Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1956) , rather than estimating each viewer's preference vector.
The empirical marketing and psychometric literatures have also developed many spatial models of choice behavior. Elrod (1988a Elrod ( ,1988b uses logit models to estimate up to two latent attributes and the distribution of consumer preferences. The former study uses a linear utility specification while the latter uses an ideal point model. As noted by Elrod and others, the standard ideal point model asymptotically nests the linear structure as the product characteristics approach plus or minus infinity. In Section 4.6 we show how the standard ideal point model may be transformed such that, for each dimension of the attribute space, the linear structure is obtained by setting a single parameter to zero. This is an essential transformation for convergence if one or more of the dimensions is linear (or nearly linear), as in our case. More recently, Elrod and Keane (1995) and Chintagunta (1994) estimate product characteristics using panel data on laundry detergent purchases. Elrod and Keane use a factor analytic probit model with normally distributed preferences, whereas Chintagunta uses a logit model with discrete segments of consumer types.
Economists have focused on the theoretical issues of the television industry (Spence and Owen, 1977) , whereas marketing researchers have focused on the empirical issues. Marketers approach difficulty of measuring show characteristics in various ways. One approach classifies shows a priori. Rust and Alpert (1984) classify shows into one of five categories: Action Drama, Psychological Drama, Comedy, Sports, and Movie. This approach suffers from the subjective classification of shows and the assumption of homogeneity of shows within each category. While one might expect well-chosen categories to perform well, we find that a model with only one latent attribute more accurately predicts covariances in choices than does a model with six categories.
The difficulty of measuring show characteristics led other researchers to estimate them. Gensch and Ranganathan (1974) use factor analysis and Rust, Kamakura, and Alpert (1992) use multidimensional scaling. The main weakness of these approaches is that they ignore that a positive covariance between two shows need not imply these shows are similar. It might instead reflect the competition these shows face or the impact of state dependence on choices. Our structural estimation approach explicitly considers competition among shows and state dependence in choices.
Furthermore, it has the conceptual benefit of being derived from consumer behavior.
The model
In each period t, individual i chooses from among J = 6 mutually exclusive and exhaustive options indexed by j, corresponding to (1) TV off, (2) ABC, (3) CBS, (4) NBC, (5) Fox, and (6) nonnetwork programming, such as cable or public television. Let y i·t denote the response vector, such that for j = 1, . . . , J, y ijt = 1 if i chooses j at time t and y ijt = 0 otherwise. In the following subsections, we describe the utility from watching a network show, the utility from a nonnetwork show, and finally, the utility from not watching TV.
The utility from watching network television
Individual i's utility from watching network j at time t may be written as
where V ijt is a function of show characteristics, S ijt is a function of state variables reflecting the choice in the previous period, and ε ijt represents idiosyncratic utility, which is independent across all (i, j, t) and uncorrelated with the V ijt and S ijt . We first present the show characteristics component and then discuss state dependence.
Our model is not the only specification available. We use this particular structure because of its intuitive appeal and ability to nest alternative specifications. In the empirical portion of the paper, we compare our specification to alternatives and find the data supports our structure.
Show characteristics
The component of utility from show characteristics has an intercept and an ideal point structure over K attributes, written as
where ν i,z denotes viewer i's K-dimensional ideal point, z jt denotes the K-dimensional location of network j's show during period t, A is a symmetric K by K matrix of the individual's sensitivity to distances between her ideal point and show locations, and η jt denotes an attribute equally valued by all individuals. When none of these parameters is observed by the econometrician, this structure is a latent attribute space. We assume that viewer's preferences ν i,z are constant over time. Furthermore, viewers know the locations of all shows and η jt .
While a linear specification yields constant marginal utility for the attributes, this quadratic structure generates positive marginal utility at some attribute levels and negative marginal utility at other levels. Suppose A is a diagonal matrix. For each dimension a negative weight yields an ideal point structure in which ν i,z specifies the most preferred level for that attribute. Dimensions with positive weights exhibit the less intuitive anti-ideal point structure. While some product attributes, such as the fuel efficiency of a car, are described well by a linear structure, we feel the potential characteristics of television shows are more appropriately modeled by the quadratic or ideal point framework. 6 For example, a little violence may excite some viewers, but too much may disturb them. Another attribute could be characters' ages. A viewer who prefers shows about characters in their thirties would derive less utility from shows with characters in their twenties or forties, and even less utility from shows about teenagers or people older than fifty.
State dependence
Show characteristics are not the only factor in viewing choices. A viewer's choice is also influenced by her choice in the previous period. This state dependence contributes to a significant lead-in effect in the aggregate ratings. On average, over 56 percent of a show's viewers watched the end of the previous show on the same network. This lead-in effect ranges from 32 to 81 percent, and has a significant role in determining optimal network strategies. State dependence is usually considered to arise from costs to switching channels. Such costs are perhaps due to differences in information regarding the networks' offerings, the costs of discussing a change by a group of viewers, or the physical cost of changing the dial or finding the remote control. Moshkin and Shachar (2000) demonstrate empirically that state dependence is generated by switching costs for about half the viewers and by incomplete information and search costs for the remaining viewers. 7
There exists a potential bias in the estimation of the state dependence due to the network strategy of airing similar shows in sequence. Viewers may stay tuned to the same channel because that channel continues to offer the type of show they prefer. A model without heterogeneous consumer preferences or with inaccurate a priori show classifications will yield biased estimates of state dependence. In our model persistence due to programming strategies and preferences is captured by the attribute space in equation (1). 8
We account for persistence due to switching costs via state variables describing the individual's choice in the previous period as it relates to each of the current period's alternatives. The state variables with respect to watching network j at time t for viewer i are defined in Table 1 .
These flow variables enter utility via S ijt , the component of utility due to state dependence.
6 Of course, the quadratic structure also nests the linear model. In the latent attribute case, however, this nesting is asymptotic and may lead to nonconvergence of the estimator. Section 4.6 discusses this problem and presents a solution.
7 State dependence in viewing behavior has received attention in previous studies. The treatment is more parsimonious in models of individual viewer behavior than in models of aggregate ratings. Darmon (1976) introduces the concept of channel loyalty and Horen (1980) estimates a lead-in effect, both using aggregate ratings models. Rust and Alpert (1984) use individual-level data to estimate an audience flow model, and Shachar and Emerson (2000) allow switching costs to vary across shows and across demographically defined viewer segments.
8 Restricting the rank of the latent attribute space can also lead to biased estimates. Hence we use the Bayes Information Criterion to determine the number of relevant attributes, as discussed in Section 4.5. tuned to network j, and the show on j is a continuation from last period. Sample ijt tuned to network j, and the show on j is entering the second quarter-hour and is longer than 30 minutes. InP rogress ijt tuned to something other than network j, and the show on j is a continuation from last period.
The complete structure for individual i's utility from watching network j at time t is
where both δ Start,i and δ Cont,i are permitted to vary across viewers, according to their L demographic characteristics X i , as follows.
δ Start,i = X i Γ δ , and
The term δ Start,i serves as a "base" measure of persistence for viewer i, while δ Cont is the incremental cost of leaving a continuing show that was watched last period. 
The utility from watching a nonnetwork channel
The utility from a nonnetwork show has the same structure as utility from a network show.
However, our data does not specify which of the many nonnetwork channels is watched. As such,
we treat the nonnetwork alternative as nesting the N i nonnetwork options available to individual i. Of course, we cannot estimate characteristics for these shows and we do not know when they start. As such, we specify a common mean η N on for these shows and conjecture that switching costs are lower on the hour since most shows start on the hour. If each of the ε is an independently distributed type I extreme value random variable, then we can write the nonnetwork (j = 6) utility
where I{·} is an indicator function, Hour t = 1 if t is an hour's first quarter-hour, M id t = 1−Hour t , and
We expect δ Hour < δ M id since more shows are continuations during the hour than on the hour.
The utility from not watching TV
Individuals not watching TV are engaged in activities such as reading, meeting friends, working, and so forth. The utility from nonviewing activities differs among individuals according to their previous choice, the time of day, the day of the week, and their idiosyncratic taste for the outside alternative, ν i,Out . Formally, the utility from the nonviewing alternative (j = 1) is
where the variables Hour9 t and Hour10 t indicate t being in the 9:00 to 10:00 hour and 10:00 to 11:00 hour, respectively, the variable Day t is a vector of length 5 with all zeros except for a 1 in the current day's position, and Γ Day is an L by 5 parameter matrix. The time slot and day effects are permitted to differ across demographic segments since, for example, children go to bed earlier than adults and have fewer social opportunities than adults.
Model summary
Finally, we assume that each period viewers myopically choose their utility maximizing alternative, given their state variables as inherited from the previous period. Although some viewers may plan 9 The utility from each of the hypothetical nonnetwork channels, indexed by j = 1, . . . , Ni, is
The utility from nesting these Ni choices is simply max j (u ij t ). Under the assumption that {ε ij t }
are independently distributed type I extreme value, this maximum has the same distribution as
exp(u ij t − ε ij t ) + εi6t , where εi6t is distributed type I extreme value. This equivalence, established by Juncosa (1949) , is discussed in the chapter on extreme value distributions of Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan (1995) . Substituting (4) into this last equation and using the fact that y i,j ,t−1 = 1 is satisfied by exactly one j when yi,6,t−1 = 1 and exactly zero j otherwise yields equation 5. While criticized frequently by the networks, Nielsen ratings still serve as the standard measure of audience size for the television industry and advertisement agencies. The main complaints are: (1) Nielsen has historically suffered from a low participation rate by viewers in its survey samples because of the complicated installation of the NPM; (2) expecting everyone, even small children, to diligently press their assigned button on the NPM when they are watching is arguably unrealistic; (3) the results of Nielsen's national sample are inconsistent with the aggregated results of its local samples (measured only during the sweeps months); and (4) Nielsen does not measure out-of-home viewing.
to obtain the varied scheduling responses to live broadcasts. As such, we only use eastern time zone viewers for estimation. Fortunately, this subgroup comprises over half the dataset and is representative of the entire dataset with respect to the distribution of demographic measures and viewing patterns. The non-eastern time zone viewers are used as a holdout sample to test the model's out-of-sample prediction of the Tuesday through Friday choices, for which there are no live broadcasts.
The dataset contains 4035 households and 13,427 individuals. After dropping children under the age of two years, people not living in the eastern time zone, and people not passing Nielsen's daily data checks, 3636 individuals remain. Finally, we omit viewers who never watch network television during the prime-time weekday hours since they do not aid in estimating the parameters of interest. This amounts to assuming that people who never watch network television are not affected by changes in the networks' schedules or programs. Such an assumption seems reasonable unless drastic changes in programming are being considered. The remaining 3286 viewers are used to estimate the model.
Estimation, heterogeneity, and identification issues
In this section we first derive the likelihood function and discuss choices for modeling the unobserved heterogeneity ν i . We then discuss our use of maximum simulated likelihood. Identification issues and necessary normalizations are presented in Section 4.4, followed by a discussion of the determination of the number of dimensions in the attribute space. We conclude by presenting a transformation of the (quadratic) ideal point utility specification that is needed whenever preferences on one or more of the dimensions prefers are linear or nearly linear.
The likelihood function
For the econometrician the viewing choice, conditional on ν i , is probabilistic since ε ijt is not observed. We assume these ε ijt are drawn from independent and identical type I extreme value distributions. As McFadden (1973) illustrates, under these conditions the viewing choice probability is multinomial logit. Furthermore, since the ε ijt are independent over time, the likelihood of each viewer's history of choices for the entire week, y i , is simply the product of the probabilities of the choices in each quarter-hour, conditional on the choice in the previous quarter-hour. That is,
where θ is the vector of model parameters (z, η, δ, Γ, A), X i is the vector of observed individual characteristics, Y contains scheduling information needed to define the state variables (i.e., Cont ijt ,
Since we are interested in modeling choices from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, setting t = 1 to be 8:00 on Monday seems appropriate. Due to the state dependence, the probability of the 8:00 choice depends on y i,·,t−1 , the choice made by i at 7:45. This 7:45 choice, however, is an endogenous variable that depends on some of the same parameters driving the choices in later periods. Using the 7:45 choice as if it were exogenous would lead to a biased and inconsistent estimator, as described in Heckman (1981b) . Our solution to this initial conditions problem is to endogenize the 7:45 choice while treating 7:45 as t = 1, the start of the stochastic process for the evening's viewing. This period, however, is not really "network" programming since the local affiliates independently purchase syndicated programming of their choice. As a result, ABC affiliates in different cities will most likely air different shows. Since we do not observe these programming selections, we exlude show characteristics from the 7:45 "network" utility, which reduces to
for j = 2, . . . , 5 and t ∈ {1, 14, 27, 40, 53} .
The 7:45 utilities for j = 1 and j = 6 are the same as in equations (7) and (5), respectively, except there are no state dependence terms since the stochastic process begins at 7:45.
Implementing this solution to the initial conditions problem is trivial, except that our data does not specify which channel is watched when viewing occurs at 7:45. For these viewers the state variables relevant to the 8:00 choice are censored. The probability for period t ∈ {2, 15, 28, 41, 54}
with a censored y i,·,t−1 is
and the set Y contains the response vectorsŷ corresponding to each of the J − 1 possible 7:45 viewing choices. That is, we integrate over the possible 7:45 viewing choices using probabilities, denoted w in (9), derived from evaluating the logit model of the 7:45 choice. For individuals who choose the outside alternative j = 1 at 7:45, this integration is not necessary since choosing to watch 11 Recall that for j = 1, . . . , J, yijt = 1 if i chooses j at time t and yijt = 0 otherwise.
nothing is fully disclosed in the data. This is also why the integration is only over the j = 2, . . . , J viewing alternatives.
Since the ε ijt are assumed to be independent across individuals, the likelihood of the n = 3286 observed choice histories in the data is simply the cumulative product of the probabilities of each viewer's choice history, as given by equations (8) and (9).
Individual heterogeneity
Since ν i is unobserved, to compute the likelihood of y i we must either estimate ν i for each viewer, or integrate over its distribution. Estimating ν i is feasible only for those viewers who have at least one period of no viewing, one period of network viewing, and one period of nonnetwork viewing.
Furthermore, reasonably precise estimation of the ν i requires variation in choices exceeding this bare minimum. Since many viewers do not exhibit sufficient variation, we instead integrate out the unobserved preferences and use the resulting marginal distribution of the choice history to evaluate the likelihood. This amounts to evaluating a (K + 2)-dimensional integral for each individual. This marginal probability is
where p 0 is the density of the true distribution of viewer preferences, P 0 .
The specification of P 0 depends primarily on computational complexity and fit with the data.
The latent class approach (Kamakura and Russell [1989] , Chintagunta [1994] ) is easy to compute since the integration in equation (10) becomes a simple probability weighted average. However, the implicit assumption of homogeneity within classes is probably violated, especially when the number of classes is low. On the other hand, normally distributed heterogeneity (Hausman and Wise [1978] , Heckman [1981a Heckman [ , 1981b ) requires numerical integration and imposes a single-peaked distribution of ν i , which is poorly suited for attributes either strongly liked or disliked. Since numerical integration can be performed at reasonable cost, the choice of discrete versus continuous heterogeneity depends on the data.
Comparing likelihood values and information criteria of models with different specifications for heterogeneity is one way of assessing which P 0 is appropriate. Another check, which is feasible when using disaggregated panel data, is to estimate each individual's preference vector, holding the model's structural parameters fixed at their estimated values, given a conjectured specification of P 0 . In particular, to be "internally consistent" this empirical distribution should match P 0 . Using data on viewers whose choices vary enough to estimate their ν i , we verified that choosing P 0 to be multivariate normal indeed satisfies this check. Other specifications for P 0 may be internally consistent. The specification with seven latent classes, however, fails the consistency check. 12
12 Alternatively, P0 may be specified to be a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions. Such a P0 usually While the ν i vectors are unobserved to the econometrician, we do observe individual demographic measures that we expect to be correlated with preferences. Thus, we model the mean of P 0 to be a linear function of the L = 14 demographic measures in X i . In addition to increasing the model's predictive powers, this parameterization allows P 0 to have multiple peaks over the population of viewers. We also allow the variance of P 0 to vary across demographic groups, but only for ν i,N since the additional parameters were statistically insignificant for the other dimensions of ν i .
In short, we model viewer heterogeneity as follows:
where Γ z is an L × K matrix, Γ Out , Γ N , and Γ σ N are length L column vectors, Σ z is a K × K matrix, and σ Out is a scalar. Although the random, unobserved portions of these three components of ν i are restricted to be uncorrelated, preferences can be correlated through their demographically determined means. 13
Simulating the marginal probability
Since we assume ν i to be normally distributed, the integral in equation (10) does not have a closed form solution. A consistent and differentiable simulation estimator of s(·) iŝ
where (ν i 1 , . . . , ν i R ) are randomly drawn from the population density P 0 , specified by equation (11).
Since f (·) has a closed form in equation (8), the variance of this simulation estimator is limited to the variance induced from replacing P 0 with P R , the randomly generated empirical distribution of the viewer's preferences. Let θ denote the vector of structural parameters in the model (θ) and the parameters in the specification of P 0 in equation (11). The Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) estimator isθ
where n denotes the number of individuals. As explained in McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989) , the R variates for each individual's ν i must be independent and remain constant throughout the estimation procedure. A drawback of using MSL is the bias ofθ M SL due to the has as many peaks as latent classes and permits individuals within classes to differ. Thus, the mixture P0 avoids the major criticisms of both the discrete and continuous distributions. We estimated such models for K = 1 and K = 2 and found significant variation across classes in the mean preference vectors for each class as well as significant variation in the preference vectors within classes. However, when the dimension of the attribute space is K = 4, this mixed P0 approach is computationally infeasible. 13 Furthermore, an F test indicated that this restriction is not rejected by the data.
logarithmic transformation of s(·). Despite this bias, the estimator obtained by MSL is consistent
if R → ∞ as n → ∞, as detailed in Proposition 3 of Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) . To attain negligible inconsistency, Hajivassiliou (2000) suggests increasing R until the expectation of the score function is zero atθ M SL . 14 In our case this is achieved by R = 1024.
Rather than using standard Monte Carlo methods to evaluateŝ(·), we use Quasi-Monte Carlo (QMC) methods, the theory of which is presented in Niederreiter (1978) . 15 Such methods, which use low-discrepancy, deterministic sequences of points, have been found by Papageorgiou and Traub (1996) and others to yield rates of convergence faster than the 1/ √ R convergence of MC methods when computing integrals in models of asset prices. The performance of QMC methods varies across applications, depending on the behavior of the integrand. In simulatingŝ(·) with R = 1024, QMC integration delivers a (relative) RMSE equal to 36 percent that of MC, on average over individuals. Furthermore, QMC's error converges to zero error at a rate ranging from R −0.6 to R −0.85 , compared to R −0.5 for MC. 16 These gains reflect the greater uniformity of the Sobol sequence compared to (pseudo) random sequences, which can have significant gaps and clumping.
To further reduce the variance ofŝ(·), we employ importance sampling as described in the Monte Carlo literature (see Rubinstein 1981) . Our importance sampler is similar to that used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) . We draw (ν i,1 , . . . , ν i,R ) from a multivariate-t approximation of each person's posterior distribution of ν i , given some preliminary MSL estimate of θ, and weight the conditional probabilities to account for the oversampling from regions of ν i which lead to higher probabilities of i's actual choices. 17 For R = 1024 (pseudo) random draws, we find importance sampling reduces the RMSE ofŝ(·) by 90 percent, on average. The importance sampler may also be used with QMC, resulting in an additional 67 percent reduction in RMSE. These differences translate into significant reductions in the number of draws needed to attain a given RMSE. For some viewers, attaining 1 percent accuracy requires 100 times more draws using standard Monte
Carlo methods than importance sampling with Sobol points.
Any reduction in the variance of the estimator for s(·) reduces the bias and variance of the 14 We simulate all stochastic components of the model to construct an empirical distribution of the score function atθ M SL . A quadratic form of this score function is asymptotically distributed chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters estimated. 15 We thank John Rust for this suggestion. Rust (1997) assesses the accuracy of QMC methods in solving continuousstate, infinite-horizon Markovian decision problems.
16 The RMSE of s(yi|Xi, θ, PR) is computed using N sets of R draws from P0 as
where strue represents the true value. Since this true value is not computable, we evaluateŝ(·) using R = 2 20 Sobol points and take this to be the true value. We use the Sobol sequence generator in Press et al. (1992) . The Sobol points are uniformly dispersed on the (0,1) grid and converted to "quasi-random" N(0,1) draws via an approximation to the N(0,1) inverse distribution function.
17 Details are provided in Goettler and Shachar (1999) .
estimator of θ, which is our ultimate interest. Assessing the affect of various simulation methods on the distribution ofθ M SL requires repeated estimation. This is computationally infeasible given the number of parameters and high R.
Identification
The identification of the show characteristics is intuitive. Shows that have large joint audiences obviously appeal to the same viewers. Given the ideal point structure of our model, positive covariances in utility, and hence choices, are predicted for shows close in the attribute space. Thus,
shows with large joint audiences are estimated to have similar characteristics. Similarly, shows with small joint audiences appeal to viewers with different preferences and are therefore estimated to be distant in the attribute space. 18
This reasoning ignores the fact that large joint audiences may arise for quite different shows if one follows the other on the same network. The inclusion of state dependence in our model addresses this concern. A show will be estimated close to its lead-in show only if the retention rate is high, relative to retention rates for other sequential shows.
Spatial competition also influences the size of joint audiences. Suppose shows A and B are identical, with show C being the next closest of all the other shows. If the networks compete for similar viewers by simultaneously airing B and C, then the joint audience of A and C will be smaller than it would have been had C not been competing against B. Our structural model can distinguish both theoretically and empirically these factors of joint audience size.
More technically, define ξ ijt = (z jt − ν z,i ) A(z jt − ν z,i ) + ε ijt . This random variable is the sum of utility terms not observed by the econometrician. The covariance (across viewers) between ξ jt and ξ j t is a function of their locations, z jt and z j t , with covariance decreasing in the distance between the two shows. Based on the observed covariance of choices by individuals, we can identify the covariance matrix of ξ ijt .
The number of (j, t) pairs is 204 since we have 36 periods with three networks and 28 periods with four networks. As such, we can estimate
= 20, 910 independent moments. Without any constraints on the covariance matrix of ε ijt , all these moments are used to identify this matrix.
18 Nothing in this argument relies on viewers preferring shows with similar observed characteristics. If viewers generally seek "variety," then shows with different observed characteristics will have large joint audiences and will be close in the estimated attribute space. As discussed in the results section, the empirical fact that viewers generally do not seek variety leads to a high correlation between the estimated zjt and (potentially) observable show characteristics.
It's still possible that a minority group of viewers may seek variety, or that viewers may seek variety within a night but not over the week. To assess the former we estimated a specification that allowed for latent classes of viewers to have different values of A, which measures sensitivity to distances. However, the range of estimated A values indicated that while viewers differ in the extent to which they dislike variety, no group of viewers actually preferred variety. To assess the seeking of variety within a night, we allowed A to depend on the number of hours of television watched earlier that night. We found the differences to be insignificant. In short, we find no evidence of systematic variety-seeking behavior.
However, since we assume that ε ijt is i.i.d., we can use these moments to identify the location parameters in z as well as the other model parameters. Essentially, the parameters are identified by the structure they impose on the 20,910 moments. 19 While this structure identifies shows' locations, it does not distinguish between A and the scale of the space, determined by Γ z , Σ z , and z. Conceptually, the importance of the attribute space in viewers' decisions may be increased by either changing A to increase the sensitivity of utility to distances between shows and ideal points, or by changing Γ z , Σ z , and z to increase these distances.
Even if we normalize all elements in A to a given constant, there exists an infinite number of Γ z , Σ z , and z combinations that yield the same likelihood. Any rotation or shifting of the attribute space that preserves the distances between the shows and ideal points will not change the likelihood.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the mean ideal point for at least one demographically defined group of viewers to be the origin, and normalize to zero the off-diagonal elements in both Σ z and A. Furthermore, the diagonal elements of A are normalized to have a magnitude of 1. That is, for each dimension k, the preference vector is either an ideal point (A kk = −1) or an anti-ideal
Each period of a given network show is restricted to have the same characteristics and η value. As such, a half-hour show and a two-hour movie both have K + 1 show-specific parameters.
Given our intent of uncovering fundamental attributes of the shows, this restriction is natural. 21
Turning to the identification of η, we can identify five mean utility parameters for the six alternatives in each time slot. We set η N on = 0 for all periods. 22
The number of dimensions
The number of relevant product attributes, or rank of the attribute space, K, is not included in the estimatorθ. Rather, we determine the rank of the attribute space by estimating the model using K = 1, . . . , 5 and computing the Bayes Information Criterion for each model, as well as other measures of fit reported in Table 8 . The model with K = 4 has the lowest BIC using either the 19 While the covariance of ε is a diagonal matrix, the covariance of ξ, which represents the unobserved or random component of utility, is not diagonal. As such, this specification of random utility does not possess the well-known "independence of irrelevant alternatives" property. Our choice of type I extreme value ε is for simplicity in computing the conditional probability of equation (8).
20 An alternative normalization is to normalize Σz to be an identity matrix and to estimate both the sign and magnitude of the (diagonal) weight matrix A. Since viewer heterogeneity is of particular interest, we prefer to estimate Σz and normalize A. We did use this alternative normalization to verify that A kk is negative for each dimension.
21 In general it is possible to estimate different locations for each quarter-hour segment. However, this restriction is essential for the identification of ηj,7:45, j = 2, . . . , J. Shows that have a larger audience at 8:00 than expected given ηj,8:00, which equals ηj,8:15, probably had a larger lead-in audience from 7:45. This leads the estimation procedure to choose a higher ηj,7:45. If ηj,8:00 were free to determine the expected audience size during the 8:00-8:15 quarter hour, then ηj,7:45 could not be identified.
22 Since the networks' ηj are fixed for at least two quarter-hours, we can estimate ηNon in some periods. In particular, we can estimate ηNon,t as long as at least one network ηj,t "overlaps" with a normalized η N on,t for t = t . estimation data or the holdout sample. The estimates of this specification are presented below and serve as the basis for our analysis of network competition.
A useful transformation
The ideal point structure of our model is motivated by the appeal of quadratic preferences for show attributes. From an econometric perspective, given the latent nature of z jt , this structure can cause convergence problems. For simplicity, consider the case when K = 1, A = −1, and ν i,z ∼ N (0, σ 2 )
. Defineν i,z ≡ ν i,z /σ, so thatν i,z ∼ N (0, 1). In this case equation (1) becomes
Clearly, z jt is not identified by the role of z 2 jt since η jt adjusts to maintain the value of the intercept. Instead, z jt is identified by the term 2z jt σν i,z . Similarly, σ is identified by its role in σ 2ν2 i,z since z jt is free to adjust such that z jt σ is unaffected. Indeed, when estimating the model as specified in (15) (or equivalently, (1)), the z jt blow up as σ gets small. Using (15), the linear random coefficients model can be asymptotically approached but never attained since when σ = 0 the model has only an intercept. A solution to both the convergence problem and asymptotic nesting is to reparameterize the model usingz jt ≡ z jt σ andη jt ≡ η jt − z 2 jt +z 2 jt . As such,
This transformation is essential whenever one or more of the dimensions has σ near zero and z jt σ far from zero (for some (jt)) since estimating parameters whose true values are huge (relative to the other parameters) is almost impossible.
The transformation for arbitrary (K, Γ z , Σ z , A) is
Letting z i =Γ z X i +ν i,z , this transformation yields
We numerically integrate over the N(0,1) distribution ofν and estimate the parametersz,η,Γ z , and Σ z . Recall from section 4.4 that A is normalized to be the negative identity matrix and the off-diagonal elements of Σ z are normalized to be zero.
Results
We first present estimates of the parameters related to the outside alternative, nonnetwork viewing, and state dependence. We then present the estimates of show locations and viewer preferences.
Finally, we evaluate the model's predictive power and compare it to the performance of a model that categorizes each show a priori as one of six possible types.
We report the results for a model with K = 4 dimensions of the attribute space as discussed in Section 4.5. The integral in equation (10) is evaluated numerically using importance sampling with 1024 points from a Sobol sequence, as detailed in Section 4.3. The (asymptotic) standard errors are derived from the inverse of the simulated information matrix. 23
Switching costs parameters
The variables with the strongest predictive power are the state variables. Averaging over all 60 periods, 96 percent of nonviewers in a given period continue to be nonviewers the next period.
Similarly, 65 percent of nonnetwork viewers continue to watch nonnetwork programming. For a network channel this proportion is 50 percent for shows just beginning and 85 percent for shows continuing from the previous period. These high-average persistence rates are explained primarily by the (relatively) large switching costs presented in Table 2 . 24
As expected, the cost of leaving a network when its show continues from the previous period is higher than when the show starts that period. For the baseline demographic group, the cost is 
Outside utility parameters
We estimated a separate mean utility η Out,t for each of the 60 periods. These intercepts revealed similar values across nights, with a slight increase through each night. For simplicity, we report 23 The reported standard errors, therefore, neglect any additional variance due to simulation error in the numerical integration.
24 Idiosyncratic preferences (νi) also account for some of the observed persistence. When the model is estimated without νi the switching cost estimates are higher.
25 The baseline demographic group-defined by having all zeros for the demographic dummy variables-corresponds to men, 35 to 49 years old, in a household with annual income between $20,000 and $40,000, with children, in a nonurban county, with multiple televisions, and a head of household with no more than a high school education. The 25 largest counties in the country are considered urban.
estimates from a model with these regularities imposed. The twelve time slot effects are reported as η Out,8:00 through η Out,10:45 in Table 3 . 26 The twelve time slot effects and the Friday effect provide the mean utility (ignoring state dependence) from the outside alternative for members of the baseline demographic group. The estimates reveal lower utility in each hour's first quarter-hour.
This reflects the tendency for viewers to begin watching television on the hour. 27 Also note that utility for the outside alternative begins an upward trend at 9:30, presumably as viewers begin to retire for the night.
The outside alternative mean utilities vary across demographic groups according to the estimates in Table 4 . These adjustments are different depending on the hour of the night and whether the day is Friday. 28 First consider the estimate of Γ Out . Except for ages 18 to 24, the utility from the outside alternative, during the hour 8:00-9:00, monotonically declines as age increases. This reflects the fact that older people watch more television than do young people. This relationship between age and utility from the outside alternative is also present for the later hours. The table reports Γ 9 + Γ Out and Γ 10 + Γ Out to emphasize this point. Note, however, that the change in utility from one hour to the next varies considerably across demographic groups. As expected, children between the ages of 2 and 11 experience a much larger increase in utility as the hours pass than do older children and adults. 29
The estimates also indicate that women have slightly lower outside utility. Interestingly, income is weakly correlated with outside utility. The only statistically significant finding is that people from households with annual income exceeding $40,000 have higher outside utility during the 10:00-11:00 hour. Also, outside utility increases in the education level of the head of household, particularly during the 8:00-10:00 hours.
Another notable finding is that having multiple television sets only affects whether a person watches TV during the 10:00-11:00 hour. For households without multiple sets, the chance that a TV is in the bedroom is low. During the last hour of prime time, not being able to watch TV in the bedroom decreases the utility from watching TV, which is equivalent to increasing the utility from not watching.
26 This restriction is rejected by a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic is 156, with a 0.01 critical value of 72.9. Nonetheless, our desire to report a manageable number of parameters overrides the marginal improvement in fit. Furthermore, the other parameters are insensitive to this restriction. We also test, and reject, the hypothesis that the twelve ηOut are the same. The test statistic is 368 and the .01 critical value is 24.7.
27 Since we estimate a show-specific quality measure, ηjt for each show, our model already accounts for the possibility that higher quality shows begin on the hour. This downward blip therefore reflects an intrinsic desire to begin watching television on the hour.
28 Recall from equation 11 that X i ΓOut is the mean of νi, and from equation 7 that X i Γ9 and X i Γ10 are added to the utility for the 9:00-10:00 hour and 10:00-11:00 hour, respectively.
29 For example, consider the increase in (nonviewing) utility from 8:15 to 10:15 for a 10-year-old child (from a baseline household) and a 35-year-old (baseline) man. For the man, utility rises by ηOut,10:15 −ηOut,8:15 = 2.764−2.398 = 0.366 utils, while for the child utility rises by (1.461 + 2.764) − (0.523 + 2.398) = 1.304 utils. Unlike all other age groups, men aged 18 to 24 years (from baseline households) have higher utility for the outside alternative at 8:15 than at 10:15.
Finally, the only significant day effect is that children aged 2 to 11 years have a lower outside alternative utility on Friday. 30 People of all ages have fewer pressing concerns on Friday night, which tends to lower the utility from the outside alternative. While adults and older children counter this decrease with social opportunities, young children primarily watch more television.
After accounting for the effect of these demographic characteristics, there remains a significant degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the taste for the outside alternative. The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic ν i,Out is 0.651, exceeding the 0.506 standard deviation (across i) of X i Γ Out . Table 5 reports the parameters affecting N i , the number of nonnetwork channels available to viewer i. The most significant factor is cable subscription status. For the baseline viewer adding basic cable increases the mean N i from 4.54 to 13.81, the standard deviation from 7.52 to 15.19, and the median from 2.35 to 9.29. 31 Not surprisingly, we also find a greater number of nonnetwork channels in urban areas. The second most significant factor is being female, which significantly lowers N i , presumably due to the frequency of sports programming on many nonnetwork channels. Table A1 , in the appendix, presents the prime-time schedule of network programs for the five nights in our sample. Each show'sη estimate is also reported. This parameter, termed unexplained popularity in Section 2.1.1, reflects a show's ability to attract viewers with diverse preferences. The standard errors of these estimates range from 0.222 to 0.297.
Nonnetwork utility parameters

Show characteristics
The most interesting aspect of our model is the latent attribute space. The simplest way to inspect the location parameters is to plot thez jt . Figures 1 and 2 The estimates ofΓ z are reported in Table 6 . According to these estimates preferences are not independent across the four dimensions. For example, children tend to prefer shows with high levels of attribute 3 and low levels of attribute 4, while older viewers tend to prefer shows with low levels of attribute 3 and high levels of attribute 4. As discussed in Section 4.4, the attribute space may be freely rotated without changing the model's implications or the likelihood function. In estimation we normalize Σ z to be diagonal. After estimation we rotate the show locations and preference vectors 30 Estimation of a simplified model (without integration) indicates that the day effect is insignificant for all demographic groups and all days except for children on Friday. We impose these zero effects in the full model. 31 The mean of ln(x) where x ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ) is exp(µ + σ 2 /2) and the variance is exp(2µ + σ 2 ) exp(σ 2 − 1).
such that the preference vectors are independent across dimensions. This is a natural normalization similar to those used in factor analysis to obtain orthogonal (and interpretable) dimensions of the attribute space. The resulting locations and preferences are reported in Figures 1 and 2 . Table 6 reports the estimates of the standard deviation of idiosyncratic preference heterogeneity, Σ 0.5 z . For each dimension this variation is more than 4.7 standard deviations greater than zero, indicating, as discussed in Section 4.6, that preferences have the ideal point structure rather than the linear random coefficient structure. 32 While there is significant idiosyncratic (or unobserved) variation in viewer preferences, much of the variation in ν i,z can be explained by demographics.
The percent of the variation in preferences ν i,z explained by the 14 demographic measures is 73.2, 34.5, 91.3, and 84.2 percent, respectively for dimensions 1 through 4.
Interpreting the latent attributes
While the show locations are based on the objective data, their interpretation is based on our subjective knowledge, perception, and understanding of these shows. We estimated many specifications of the model and in all cases a split between sitcoms and nonsitcoms was clearly evident.
This finding is in accordance with the industry view that the most distinguishing characteristic of a television show is whether it is a sitcom. Furthermore, in every specification with at least two latent attributes, one of the attributes reflected the ages of the characters and targeted viewers. 
Measuring show similarity
Simultaneously processing the information in all four dimensions is difficult. Two shows that are close in one figure may be far from one another in the other figure. One way of processing the information is to construct a matrix of the distances between each pair of shows. The maximum distance is 1.44, the minimum distance is 0.04, and the mean distance is 0.64. But what do these numbers mean? A more meaningful number is the correlation (across viewers) in utility derived from the attribute space. For shows located at z a and z b , we define
This correlation depends on show distances, angles between shows, and the distribution of preferences ν i,z . Correlation is also a better measure of competition between two shows, because it directly measures the extent to which two shows compete for the same viewers. 33 Using all 64
shows, the lowest correlation is -0.630, the highest is 0.999, and the mean is 0.363. It is interesting and encouraging to note that while a network's shows from the same evening are often located quite close to one another (in Figures 1 and 2 sequence. This result indicates that our model distinguishes, as expected, between the two sources of large joint audiences-switching costs and similarity in the shows' attributes.
Another tool for analyzing the estimated attribute space is cluster analysis. The average linkage algorithm of Sokal and Michener (1958) groups the 64 shows as presented in Table A2 in the appendix. 35 We find the shows are intuitively categorized by five clusters, which we call Sitcom Old (SO), Sitcom Young (SY), Drama Fiction (DF), Drama Real (DR), and News Magazines (NM).
Increasing the number of clusters to six identifies within SO a subgroup we call Sitcom Middle (SM).
Increasing the number of clusters to seven yields a subgroup within SY of Fox-like "sitcoms." This clustering of shows yields categories that accord well with beliefs of network strategists and others who are familiar with these shows.
It is important to note, however, that there is much variation in show characteristics among shows in the same clusters. Homogeneity of shows within categories implies ρ u = 1 for shows within a category. While NM shows have a mean ρ u of 0.89, this condition is violated by the other four categories, with ρ u means ranging from 0.64 to 0.76. Identical shows within categories would also imply some constant ρ u for any show of type A paired with a show of type B. This also fails to hold.
For example, for pairs with one SO and one DF, ρ u ranges from -0.448 to 0.924. As such, knowing 33 Furthermore, unlike ρu, euclidean distances are sensitive to whether one uses zjt orzjt since Σ varies across dimensions.
34 Each show's closest shows are presented in Table 10 of Goettler and Shachar (1999) . 35 Each show begins as its own cluster. The number of clusters is then reduced by merging the two closest clusters. With average linkage the distance between two clusters is the average distance between pairs of shows, one from each cluster. We use (1-ρu)/2 as a "distance" measure between 0 and 1. The merging proceeds until the desired number of clusters is achieved. the categories of two shows provides incomplete information regarding the extent to which they are similar. The consequences of assuming homogeneous shows within categories are discussed in the next section when we compare our results to a model using such categories.
We use the six show clusters from above to assess variety-seeking behavior. We ask, "What percentage of viewers gets at least X percent of its viewing from N show types?" Using only viewers who watch more than 1 show, we find 25 percent of viewers get 70 percent of their viewing from 1 type; 55 percent get 80 percent from 2 types; and 71 percent get 90 percent from 3 types. Hence, most viewers primarily watch a few types of shows. Using our model to simulate choices, we predict similar percentages-22, 51, and 67, respectively.
Goodness of fit and model comparisons
We test the model's fit in each of the 60 quarter-hours using the chi-square test presented in Heckman (1984) for models with parameters estimated from micro-data. The test statistic is a quadratic form of the difference between the observed cell counts and the model's expected cell counts. Periods with Fox have J = 6 cells and periods without Fox have J = 5 cells. 36 Using a significance level of 0.01, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified for 55 of the 60 quarter-hours. 37 We also assess the model's ability to predict viewer transitions between periods, and more generally, covariances in choices (i.e., joint audiences) for all pairs of shows. For instance, consider Table 7 , which presents actual and predicted transition matrices for Monday at 8:30, 8:45, and 9:00.
The actual transition matrices provide the percentage of viewers who undergo each transition. The predicted transition matrices provide the percentage of simulated viewers who undergo each transition. 38 These transition matrices illustrate the roles of switching costs and show characteristics, and the ability of our model to distinguish between these sources of persistence. For example, at 9:00 both ABC and NBC register low persistence measures of 40 percent and 44 percent, respectively. In addition, the transitions across networks are large and uneven. NBC loses 19 percent of its audience to CBS's Murphy Brown but gains 22 percent of ABC's audience. These flows make 36 Constructing a single chi-square statistic to test the model for all 60 periods is not computationally feasible since (ignoring the absence of Fox in some periods) 6 60 cells fully partition the response vector space. This test also appears in Moore (1977 Moore ( , 1978 Moore ( , 1983 and as a special case in Andrews (1988a Andrews ( , 1998b . 37 The rejections occur on Monday at 10:15, 10:30, and 10:45, during which ABC airs Monday Night Football and NBC airs the movie Fatal Memories, and on Friday at 9:00 and 9:30, during which NBC airs another movie. The fact that each rejection occurs in a period with long shows leads us to believe the rejections are due to the restriction that show characteristics be identical for all quarter-hours of a given show. We prefer to keep this restriction, however, because it is intuitively appealing and it drastically reduces the number of parameters.
38 Viewers are simulated by randomly drawing νi and εi and determining the utility maximizing choices. The predicted transition matrices could alternatively be computed as averages over viewers' predicted probabilities for each choice conditional on their actual lagged choice. Since preferences are correlated with lagged choice, the integration over the unobserved νi should use random draws from P (ν|yi). Using this alternative technique, we can also compute the "hit" rate as the percentage of times that a viewer's actual choice is the most likely choice, given her lagged choice. Our model "hits" 81.7 percent of the viewing choices and 93.9 percent of the TV-off choices.
perfect sense when one considers the characteristics of the shows. Many of NBC's viewers were sitcom lovers who were not interested in Fatal Memories and hence switched to CBS to continue watching sitcoms. Similarly, many of ABC's viewers prefer crime dramas and therefore opted to watch NBC's crime-drama movie rather than football. Accurately predicting these audience flows, for both the current schedule and alternative schedules under consideration, is essential to network strategists.
The accuracy of predicted audience flows and ratings for alternative schedules depends on the model's ability to predict joint audiences for all pairs of shows-not just those currently aired in sequence. To assess the model's ability to do this, we define a pseudo correlation matrix,ρ with 
This measure is bounded by 0 and 1. Using actual choices, it varies from 0 to 0.97, with a mean of 0.16 and a standard deviation of 0.14. We constructρ using simulated viewers and compare it the actualρ. 39 Table 8 compares various specifications of the model using likelihood values, the Bayes Information Criterion, and the RMSE over the elements ofρ. We compute these measures using both the estimation sample and a holdout sample of 3143 non-eastern time zone people. 40
Models 3 through 8 all use continuous latent attribute spaces of various dimensions. Only model 6, with 451 parameters, does not use demographics in the mean of ν i,z . This model is included to demonstrate that a latent attribute space can be identified even if every person's preference vector is from the same distribution. This model performs reasonably well. Of course, predicting ratings for specific demographic groups, as the networks often desire, is much easier and better when Γ z is estimated. Interestingly, the interpretation of the attributes and clustering of the shows is robust to whether Γ z is used.
Models 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are identical except for K, the dimension of the attribute space. As expected, all measures of fit improve monotonically as K increases. However, the BIC is minimized by K = 4. The estimates of this model are reported in this section and used for the analysis in the next section.
The advantage of continuous show attributes over show categories is illustrated by models 9 and 10. Both models characterize shows using categories and allow viewers to differ in their preferences over these categories. Model 9 allows preferences to vary only across demographic segments, while model 10 also allows for unobserved differences among viewers. The show categories are sitcom-old, sitcom-middle, sitcom-young, drama-real, drama-fiction, and news-magazine, as 39 We actually computeρ across all quarter-hours of every show. Enough viewers are simulated to ensure a negligible simulation error. 40 We omit Monday from the computation of the holdout likelihood due to the live broadcast of Monday Night Football. The likelihood for the holdout sample is therefore higher than for the estimation sample.
reported in Table A2 . 41 Model 3, which uses just a single latent continuous attribute (and fewer parameters), outperforms models 9 and 10 with six "observed" show categories. This highlights the importance of allowing shows to be characterized continuously-even if along only a single attribute.
Spatial competition and scheduling
In Section 5.4 we demonstrated that our estimated attribute space is intuitive. We now use the estimated product locations to characterize and assess firm behavior. 42 First we characterize spatial competition given our estimates. We then illustrate that firm behavior, for the most part, is explained by an equilibrium model in which firms maximize ratings, which serve as a proxy for profits. 43 Our model suggests firm behavior is not optimal in the use of two "rules of thumb," as discussed in Section 6.2. We focus on the big three networks since, in 1992, Fox was a newcomer that ABC, CBS, and NBC largely ignored.
Spatial competition
While theoretical results of product differentiation equilibrium are available for some spatial competition models, such as Hotelling (1929) and many of the models discussed in Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) , there are no such results for competition among multiple firms in multiple dimensions. Here, we examine whether Hotelling's principle of minimal differentiation applies, given the distribution of preferences. If it does not hold, then to what extent do firms differentiate their products in equilibrium? We find that firms in this industry differentiate their products, and that this strategy is consistent with a Nash equilibrium of the product location game.
Implicit in any discussion of spatial competition is a measure of the similarity (or difference) between two products. Our measure of similarity, denoted ρ u , is the correlation (across viewers) of utility derived from the attribute space, as defined in equation (18). This measure, for shows A and B, is nearly identical to the correlation (across viewers) of the probability of watching show A with the probability of watching show B. This measure captures the extent to which two shows compete for the same viewers.
41 Our use of categories based on the estimated show characteristics essentially assumes one could determine a priori which categories to use, and which shows belong in each category. In practice this is unlikely, but we want to be favorable in our treatment of this approach. Model 9 is similar to the audience flow models of Rust and Alpert (1984) and Rust and Eechambadi (1989) , which estimate the preferences that 8 demographic groups (defined by 2 age groups, 2 genders, and 2 education levels) exhibit for five different show types.
42 Throughout our analysis we assume firms know-or act as if they know -all product locations and the other estimated parameters of the model.
43 Goettler (1999) analyzes competition among the networks using an estimated revenue function and finds results similar to those found here using average ratings. We also ignore costs since in 1992 programming cost about $20,000 per minute for all shows.
Observed product differentiation
Since the networks view the 8:00-10:00 period as distinct from the 10:00-11:00 period, we consider these two periods separately. We discuss this breakdown of the night in section 6.2.3. In the early period the average ρ u of shows aired against each other is 0.307, compared to the 0.428 average over random combinations of these early shows. In the 10:00-11:00 period the average ρ u of competing shows is 0.609 compared to the average of 0.684 for randomly paired shows. Since both of these differences are significant at the 1 percent level, we find evidence of strategic counterprogramming in both periods. The tendency to counterprogram is even clearer using the show types in Table A2 and the schedule in Table A1 . In particular, these networks never simultaneously air 3 sitcoms or 3 nonsitcoms during 8:00-10:00. However, if the networks behaved nonstrategically (i.e., randomly), such events would occur in about 25 percent of the time slots since about half the shows are sitcoms.
Optimal product differentiation
We now ask whether counterprogramming is consistent with Nash equilibrium. A natural game to consider is the "scheduling game" in which each network chooses the sequence of its shows. This game, which we analyze in the next subsection, is influenced not only by consumer preferences, but also by state dependence and the restriction that each network air only its own shows. We first wish to analyze the more conceptual product location game in an environment characterized only by consumer preferences. That is, if each network could air the very popular Cheers, would they all do so? Or does the distribution of preferences, and stock of other shows, induce them to differentiate?
We consider a single time slot in which each network chooses one show from among the 64 shows in our data. With three networks this strategy space is represented by a 3-dimensional, 64 by 64 by 64 matrix. Each network's payoff is its predicted rating (i.e., market share). This normal form game, conveniently, has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Cheers, Full House, and 20/20. As expected, these are popular shows that most people recognize as being very different from one another. Indeed, the average ρ u across these shows is only 0.094, compared to an average of 0.420 across all pairs of shows. Interestingly, this equilibrium is also the collusive outcome.
This single equilibrium, however, cannot serve alone as a basis for characterizing spatial competition in this market since these three shows may be unusual in some respects, such as having unusually high η values. To obtain a characterization less sensitive to particular shows, we repeatedly select 30 shows at random and determine the Nash equilibria and collusive outcome. 44 For 998 of the 1000 iterations the equilibrium is unique and the other two cases have no pure strategy equilibrium. Letρ u denote the average ρ u over the three pairs formed from a triplet of 44 We also conducted the analysis randomly selecting 10 and 20 shows with similar results.
shows. Averaging over the 998 equilibria,ρ u is 0.116 lower than the expectedρ u if the networks behaved randomly (instead of strategically). This difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
Furthermore, over 69 percent of the equilibria haveρ u lower than the meanρ u over all possible show triplets using the 30 random shows. 45 Thus, in equilibrium firms tend to strategically differentiate their products.
Scheduling strategies
The single-time-slot game demonstrated that more is to be gained by targeting a different set of consumers than in crowding a particular high-density niche, thereby rejecting Hotelling's principle of minimal differentiation for this market. We now consider the scheduling game in which the networks choose the sequence of their current stock of shows to maximize ratings. Notice that ignoring show costs is even less problematic for the scheduling game since the strategies do not involve changing which shows are produced. We use the equilibrium of the scheduling game to determine whether observed scheduling strategies, including the treatment of 8:00-10:00 as distinct from 10:00-11:00, are optimal.
Observed scheduling strategies
In addition to the counterprogramming already presented, the networks' actual schedules reveal the use of homogeneous programming. This strategy generates high ρ u for a network's shows on the same night. The average ρ u for shows on the same night and network aired during 8:00-10:00 is 0.109 higher than the average for randomly generated schedules. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
Optimal scheduling strategies
First we describe each network's unilateral optimization problem and then our computation of equilibrium. The most straightforward approach to finding a network's optimal (best response) schedule is to simply compute the average ratings for each feasible schedule and select the schedule with the highest ratings. This approach, however, is computationally infeasible since a network with 20 prime-time shows has roughly 20! = 2.4 * 10 18 possible schedules. We employ the "iterative improvements" approach of combinatoric optimization to find approximate best response schedules.
Beginning with the network's original schedule, we execute ratings improving swaps of continuous 45 The fact that nearly 31 percent of the equilibria have less product differentiation than expected from random schedules reveals that quality considerations often dominate spatial considerations. It is also interesting to note that 607 of the 998 equilibria are the same as the collusive outcome, and the combined network ratings in the remaining cases are only 1.25 percent lower in equilibrium than in the collusive outcome. That is, the gains to differentiation are nearly fully achieved by the competitive outcome.
blocks of shows (ranging in length from 30 minutes to 3 hours) until there are no more such swaps.
This process is sure to converge, although possibly at a local minimum. 46 We first compute each network's optimal schedule for all 30 time slots, holding the other networks' schedules fixed. By airing stronger shows early and by increasing both counterprogramming and homogeneous programming, ABC, CBS, and NBC are able to increase their (predicted) weekly ratings by 15.8 percent, 12.0 percent, and 15.3 percent, respectively. 47 In each case the ratings gains are almost exclusively at the expense of nonnetwork programming and the outside alternative of not watching TV. Thus, we expect these gains to persist when the networks react. We find a Nash equilibrium for the static scheduling game by cycling through the networks, allowing each network to play its best response schedule given the most recent schedules of the other networks. Each of the big three networks has higher average ratings in equilibrium, although Fox is worse off. Ratings increase by 13.3 percent for ABC, 6.1 percent for CBS, 15.7 percent for NBC, and fall by 6.8 percent for Fox. 48 While ABC and CBS have equilibrium gains lower than their best response gains, NBC benefits from the strategic responses of its competitors.
The equilibrium gains for ABC, CBS, and NBC come primarily at the expense of nonviewing and nonnetwork viewing. Since most nonnetwork channels offer the same programming (music, news, sports, etc.) in every time slot, their ability to respond to the networks is limited. Thus, while our equilibrium ignores strategic moves by nonnetwork channels, it is likely that such moves have little impact. Table 9 reports ratings and scheduling strategies for the actual and equilibrium schedules of ABC, CBS, and NBC. 49 Comparing columns labelled "Actual" with columns labelled "Equilibrium" reveals three strategies that are implemented more extensively in equilibrium than in the actual schedules-counterprogramming (low CP), homogeneous programming (high NH), and "start strong" (declining η). 50 The first two strategies were discussed above. The third strategy results from the state dependence (i.e., switching costs), which induces firms to air their strongest shows early in the night since viewers captured by early shows tend to stay tuned even when the 46 Goettler (1999) investigates various modifications of this approach, such as starting at random schedules and allowing for simultaneous swaps of up to four blocks. The improvements in the attained ratings are minimal and not worth the increased computational demands.
47 These improvements are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The standard deviation of weekly average ratings, using random draws from the distribution of νi and from the asymptotic distribution of the estimatorθ M SL , is less than 0.26 for each of these networks. The standard deviations of the gains are all less than 0.13. The improvement for Fox is an insignificant 2.2 percent.
48 While the equilibrium reported is not unique, the ratings gains differ by no more than 0.4 across all equilibria we've found. However, other equilibria may exist that differ by more than this amount.
49 Fox's equilibrium schedule is the same as its actual schedule. 50 The differences between actual CP and equilibrium CP are most dramatic when measuring CP for all periods, 8:00-11:00. The same holds for NH. You may notice that ABC's actual CP is greater than its actual NH for 8:00-11:00. As such, ABC's shows are more similar to their same-time-slot competitors than to the other shows aired by ABC on the same night. The same is true for NBC. However, for both these networks CP is much less than NH when using only shows aired 8:00-10:00. The poor implementation of counterprogramming and homogenous programming over the entire 8:00-11:00 period is discussed in the next subsection on "rules of thumb."
show ends. In equilibrium show quality (as captured by η jt ) generally decreases through the night. 51
Thus, while we find that counterprogramming, homogeneous programming, and "starting fast" are optimal strategies, the networks use these strategies suboptimally.
Interestingly, we find that collusive behavior in the scheduling game is unable to increase the networks' combined ratings. Since each network (ignoring Fox) increases ratings, the gains in the competitive equilibrium are achieved by pulling viewers from the nonviewing and nonnetwork viewing alternatives. Essentially, the increased use of counterprogramming enables the networks to provide programming in each time slot that appeals to more viewers. Also, the increased homogeneous programming induces viewers to stay tuned to the networks longer once they start watching. The collusive planner uses these same strategies for the same reasons. As such, it is not surprising that the collusive outcome is no better than Nash equilibrium.
"Rules of thumb"
Qualitatively, our equilibrium analysis of scheduling confirms the "optimality" of several strategies used by the networks. That is, the Nash equilibrium of our model predicts the network strategies we observe. However, the discrepancy between the actual and predicted strategies and the suboptimal ratings require an explanation.
This suboptimality is explained primarily by two "rules of thumb" employed by the networksno sitcoms after 10:00 and no news magazines before 10:00 (during the week). These rules limit counterprogramming since sitcoms appeal to very different viewers than do news magazines. They also limit homogeneous programming since a schedule with sitcoms early in the night must necessarily offer a different type of show at 10:00. The differences in our measurements of these strategies for 8:00-10:00 versus 8:00-11:00, reported in Table 9 , suggest these limitations are severe. The strength of news magazines also implies that these rules limit each network's ability to "start fast."
The equilibrium schedules violate these "rules of thumb" almost every night to attain the high levels of these strategies reported in Table 9 . This is the most apparent deviation of actual network schedules from schedules our model suggests are optimal.
Since 1992 the networks have abandoned one of these rules; news magazines are now aired frequently before 10:00. According to network strategists sitcoms continue to air primarily before 10:00 since they are only 30 minutes long and viewers are more likely to turn off the television at 10:30 if they are not in the middle of a show. Our model, however, suggests that counterprogramming ought to be pursued across all time periods-despite the increasing utility for nonviewing in the last hour.
51 Regressions based on 5000 random ABC schedules reveal that these three strategies explain 74 percent of the variation (across schedules) in ABC's predicted ratings. For CBS and NBC the R-squares are 60 percent and 62 percent, respectively.
Predicting ratings for sitcoms after 10:00 can be viewed as "out-of-sample" since the schedule during the data collection had no sitcoms this late. If our extropolation of viewer preferences for sitcoms after 10:00 is wrong, then our predictions may be inaccurate. Fortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that people who watch TV after 10:00 p.m. do desire sitcoms. In recent years several nonnetwork channels have identified (and taken) the opportunity to serve sitcom viewers after 10:00. Furthermore, many local network affiliates enjoy high ratings from sitcoms aired at 11:00. In some markets Seinfeld reruns have attracted more viewers than the local news, leading other affiliates to air additional sitcoms at 11:00. We believe these trends indicate the presence of a substantial audience for sitcoms after 10:00, and help justify airing sitcoms on the networks during 10:00-11:00.
An alternative explanation for the discrepancies between actual and optimal schedules may be that schedule changes are costly. Commercial time used to promote a schedule change has a high opportunity cost of foregone advertisement revenue. The schedule for the week we study (November 1992), however, was determined several months in advance and was promoted in September. Hence, these opportunity costs were incurred for promoting a suboptimal schedule. Moreover, Goettler (1999) finds that the increase in advertisement revenues from a single schedule change is significantly higher than an estimate of the opportunity cost. While we believe our model provides convincing evidence against the "rules of thumb," we recognize that costs of schedule changes may contribute to the difference between actual and optimal schedules.
Bounded rationality
We find that even when we acknowledge the above "rules of thumb," the networks appear to behave suboptimally. In the Nash equilibrium of the shorter 8:00-10:00 scheduling game, the average ρ u is 0.213. For this time period, however, we observe an average ρ u of 0.307. The difference between the actual and the equilibrium counterprogramming is significant at the 1 percent level. How can we explain the discrepancy?
First we need to elaborate on the decision-making process. While we use viewer-level choice data, the networks only had (during 1992) access to the aggregate Nielsen ratings and some aggregate measures of audience transitions (i.e., joint audiences). Network strategists made their decisions based on these aggregate data and their intuition. While we assume they act rationally, it might be difficult for them to know where each show is located in a continuous four-dimensional space and to determine the optimal schedule of these shows. 52 It is easier to solve a simpler problem, such as determining the best schedule of shows located in a two-dimensional space.
To examine whether some degree of "bounded rationality" or limited information leads to the discrepancy between the actual and predicted strategies and the suboptimal ratings, we compute the Nash equilibrium schedules when ratings are predicted by a model restricted to have only two latent attributes. The results suggest that firms may indeed be limited-observed counterprogramming using the reduced attribute space is more pronounced and closer to the optimal level. The mean ρ u for the actual schedule is 0.294, which is much lower than the 0.386 average over nonstrategic random schedules and quite close to the mean of 0.261 for the Nash equilibrium schedule. While the difference between actual and predicted counterprogramming is statistically significant, it is much lower than the discrepancy when shows differ along four attributes. Furthermore, the predicted ratings gain over the actual schedule is 15 percent lower using the two-dimensional model. This finding highlights a key aspect of spatial competition. Firms face a difficult task in identifying competing products when the products have several attributes, some of which are latent.
Furthermore, failing to account for the complexity (i.e., high dimensionality) of consumer preferences can lead to suboptimal strategies. In such a setting panel data detailing consumer choices are extremely valuable. As firms increase their use of such data they can improve their strategies and increase both profits and consumer welfare. 53
Conclusion
We present an empirical study of spatial competition and a methodology to estimate demand for products with unobservable characteristics. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the methodology with panel data on the television industry. Using our estimated demand, we find that firms' observed strategies (such as the degree of product differentiation) are generally confirmed to be optimal in a Nash equilibrium analysis. Discrepancies between the actual and optimal strategies reflect the networks' adherence to "rules of thumb," and possibly, bounded rationality behavior.
We view this study as a first step towards a better understanding of nontraditional industries, particularly the entertainment industry. Increases in leisure time and technological growth in the production and provision of entertainment products indicate that this industry's importance will grow. To understand competition, we require demand and supply models for this industry. The following issues are of special interest: location games among television networks (not shows) and cable channels; location games among TV products and computer games; and location games among the producers of TV products, computer games, web sites, and movies. To analyze these issues, two extensions of the methodology used in this paper may be necessary. First, we need to consider the dynamic nature of competition. Second, issues of information, branding, and advertising need to be addressed since there is much uncertainty from the consumer's perspective. 53 Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby (1996) discuss the value of purchase history data in target marketing. Note: Values are percent of viewers watching the choice denoted by the row who also watched or were predicted to watch the choice of the column. "Non" refers to nonnetwork programming. Fox did not broadcast on Monday. Model 1 only has quality (η jt ), state dependence, Γ Out , and Γ N . Model 2 adds two parameters-the variances of ν i,Out and ν i,N . Model 3 adds one latent attribute and parameterizes Var(ν i,N ) = exp(X i Γ σ N ) 2 ). Models 4-8 are the same as 3 except with more latent attributes, and model 6 sets Γ z = 0. Models 9 and 10 both use six show categories from Table A2 . Model 9 has no ν i heterogeneity. Model 10 has a ν i element for each show category and the same ν i,Out and ν i,N as models 3-8. Model 7 is the specification used throughout Sections 5 and 6. Rating is the average market share over the week. CP is counterprogramming, measured by average ρ u with competing shows. NH is nightly-homogeneity, measured by average ρ u of shows on the same night for that network. 
